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Historical subjects often seem to be unrelated to current political discourse still could be
often politicized in present-day Russia. And Internet discussions on these historical
subjects could well provide insight into the views of the various segments of the country’s
population. These Internet discussions become especially important sources when one
tries to look into the minds of the Russian underground, those who have practically no
legal outlet for presenting their views. For this reason, the movie The Death of the
Byzantine Empire, shown in the very end of the Putin presidency, is especially important.
The movie, created the Orthodox priest Tikhon Shevkunov, (presumably Putin’s confessor)
made clear references to contemporary Russia.
In the view of the producer, the Byzantine Empire was strong when it followed its auto-
cratic tradition and was attached to Orthodoxy. The movie generated extensive discus-
sions, including among those who belong to Russia’s political and intellectual fringe. Quite
a few of them were neo-pagans; for them, Christianity, including Orthodox Christianity,
was Russia's curse. For them, it was an Asian creed foreign to Aryan Russians. The fact that
it was accepted by Russians implied that Russians had been subjugated by an alien, Asiatic,
force. Many of these neo-pagans were quite pessimistic in regard to the country’s future;
and, indeed, their response indicates the deep alienation of quite a few Russians, which
hardly bodes well for the country’s future.
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to the country’s future; indeed, their response indicates the
deep alienation of quite a few Russians, which hardly bodes
well for the country’s future.
In 2008, at the very end of Putin’s tenure, the movie
Death of the Byzantine Empire was shown on Russian TV.
The philosophy of the movie is clear. The Byzantine Empire
was great when it followed its Orthodoxy and authoritarian
corporatism. The inﬂuence of the West rotted the imperial
political/ideological core and weakened the empire. It
received its ﬁrst blow in 1204, when Western crusaders
took Constantinople, and the second, almost 250 years
later, when it fell under the onslaught of the Ottoman
Turks. The comparison with present-day Russia is trans-
parent, and themessage is clear: Westernization or alliance
with the West would lead Russia to the same downfall as
the Byzantines several centuries before.
Tikhon Shevkunov, the priest who created the movie,
was, according to rumors, Putin’s confessor; and the
assumption is that his views are the same as those of
considerable numbers of the Russian elite. This sort of
assumption made the movie and its ideas popular among
many Russian TV viewers, leading to intensive polemics on
the Internetdthe major source of uncensored Russian
opinions today.
Some intellectuals’ constructions have presented the
views of the most active part of the Russian populace, and,
one might assume, a considerable segment of the Russian
elite. Of these, some have supported Tikhon’s premises and
see in theWest the source of all Russian evil. Others have an
opposite view and regard the major threat as from the East,
mostly the Muslim world. With all their differences, these
two groups mostly see chances for Russia to survive and
prosper in the present political and spatial framework of
the country, broadly deﬁned.
There was also a layer of opinion from quite a different
group, those who were disenfranchised and deeply alien-
ated from all aspects of the country’s life. And they have
their particular views of Orthodoxy and its role in soci-
etydthe central point of the movie. Some could be regar-
ded as a new edition of “Old Believers.” In their view, the
present Orthodox Church drives Russians away not only
from the West but from the country’s true Christian tradi-
tion. The return to true Orthodoxy would require drastic
changes, which are unlikely to be implemented because the
country has no future in the long run. For others, a return to
true Orthodoxy, to true Russia, would require a return to
the pre-Mongolian times of Kievan Rus’.
For yet others, in particular, neo-pagans, Orthodoxy is
just an oppressive and foreign creed, an integral part of an
oppressive system that has tortured Russia for centuries.
For them, the Golden Age was not in pre-Mongolian Rus’
but in the pre-Christian pagan past. Return to this era is
seen as impossible; this has led them to the feeling that,
regardless of any changes, Russia is as doomed as the
Byzantine Empire.
1. Diomid and the crisis of the Orthodox Church
A deep pessimism in regard to Russia’s future is related
by some of the movie viewers with their critical views ofthe Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, the Orthodox Church
in present-day Russia has experienced serious troubles.
A manifestation of the depth of the crisis is the case of
Bishop Diomid, who rebelled against the entire church
hierarchy. He accused them of immorality, caring about
nothing except personal enrichment and allowing the rich
to rob the poor (Credo.ru, 2008a; Vermisheva, 2007). In his
view, both the Moscow (Moskovskaia Patriarkhia) and
Constantinople Patriarchs have betrayed Orthodoxy and
are ready to surrender it to Catholicism (Dukh khristianina,
2008). He also attacked the Kremlin, proclaiming that the
present regime does not act in the Russian people’s inter-
ests (Gazeta.ru, 2007). Finally, he declared Patriarch Aleksei
II of Moscow and all Russia anathema.
Diomid’s case became a major event in Russian quasi-
religious and quasi-political life at the end of Putin’s pres-
idency. A popular explanation was that he was actually
a creation of the Kremlin elite. It connects Diomid with
intrigue at the very top of the elite and, according to some
pundits, provides clues about the elite’s plans for the
future. This general theoretical framework has led to
a variety of more precise explanations.
Some believed that Diomid’s actions reﬂect the political
struggle in the Church and the Russian elite in general, who
are locked in a mortal struggle (Credu.ru, 2008b). Some
even believed Diomid is the creation of members of the
elite who want to install a monarchy if the present regime
fails (Razdumyvaiushchii, 2008). In this interpretation, he is
a product of “Jewish power” in the Kremlin, which wants to
create a split among Russian Orthodox people as the only
way to survive, and possibly to install a puppet monarchy.
The point is that the ideological brainwashers of the regime
and the Orthodox Church could not really protect the
regime and lead people away from revolt.
Many Orthodox Russians hate the present Moscow
Patriarch. They assume he actually leads the “kikes’ church”
(zhidovstvuiushchaia tserkov) (Kak raskruchivaetsia el’tsin-
skii stsenarii, 2007: 3). Church leaders with such a reputa-
tion could hardly lead the masses away from harsh dealing
with the current elite, and here Diomid might be of great
help. Many people would support him, and he would help
organize them in a sort of detachment of the Orthodox
oprichniki, even a sort of Orthodox hunveibins to buttress
the regime and possibly help create a puppet monarchy (a
reference to the “Red Guards” in China who engaged in
pogrom-type violence during the Cultural Revolution).
Other observers saw the rise of Diomid as the result of
the popularity of his views among average people. His
enemies try to discredit him because he shows the core
nature of the present regime. During Soviet rule, the
authorities preached atheism, but their moral code was
quite similar to the Christian one. The present regime
actually preaches Satanism (Dobychin, 2008), and Diomid
saw this clearly. Still, it would be wrong to see Diomid’s
conﬂict with the church as a personal grudge. His actions
were caused by a variety of reasons, the major one the deep
disenchantment of a considerable number of average
Russians with the Russian Orthodox Church and the entire
political establishment. This could be proved by the vicious
attacks on Diomid by both Kremlin and Church authorities.
Both wish to remove him. He is accused of stealing church
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onment. And there seem to be other plans as well. Diomid
stated his enemies want to put him in prison or in
a madhouse (Credo.ru, 2008d,e).
The authorities’ fears of Diomid’s inﬂuence are quite
justiﬁed, for he has received broad support. All those who
support him state that he is an extraordinary person, quite
different from those in the Russian Orthodox hierarchy.
They point out that while Orthodoxy’s hierarchy and,
implicitly, the Kremlin’s, try to present Diomid as insane
and isolated, this is not the case. He should not be dis-
missed as an insane character whose concerns/views have
nothing to do with those of Russian society.
One reason Diomid’s views have resonated among at
least some members of Russian society, is the apparent
inability of the Orthodox Church to provide moral guidance
or improve the morals of Russian society, as was expected
by many at the beginning of the Gorbachev era. Diomid’s
supporters state that when, in 1988, Gorbachev legitimized
the thousand-year celebration of the Baptism of Russia, it
caused a real sensation. People believed Russia was on the
eve of a religious renaissance. The turn to religionwas seen
by quite a few Russians as not only a return to Russia’s
historical roots, to the beliefs of their forefathers, but also as
a moral cleansing, a way to kindness, compassion, and
spirituality. At that time, when attacks against the Soviet
regime were constantly increasing, the Soviet era was seen
as the embodiment of immorality of all types. There were
high hopes for moral regeneration.
This did not happen. It is true that now two-thirds of
the Russian population regard themselves as Orthodox,
but only a few attend church on a regular basis (Aru-
tunyan, 2007). Moreover, religious ethics hardly play any
role in people’s lives. “It was not the maxim of religion but
gas and money that actually became Russia’s national
ideal” (Bolotova and Kipiani, 2008). The Orthodox Church
as an institution soon lost the image of moral anchor of
society. It quickly became integrated in the operations of
the state, returning to the role it played in pre-
revolutionary Russia. Moreover, one could assume it
continued to be a part of the state machinery as it had
since the late Stalinist era. Its return to the forefront as the
major ideological institution/prop of the regime was quite
natural when Communist ideologyda quasi-reli-
gionddisappeared from public sight. As part of the
bureaucracy of the state, the Church rendered complete
support to state policiesdas, of course, it had in the past. It
did little to ameliorate the gaping social divisions: luxu-
rious life of the few and abject poverty of many. In its
complete support of the ruling elite, it actually blessed the
exploitation of the majority by the elite, whose riches
hardly beneﬁted Russian society as a whole. Furthermore,
the Church was infected by all the ills of post-Soviet
society. There was a huge gap in living standards
between the Church hierarchy and the average priest.
Church bureaucracy, following the footsteps of the state
bureaucracy, engaged in corruption, shady deals, and
similar actions where ﬁlthy lucre was the only goal. It is
not surprising that the moral authority of the Church
became as questionable as that of the Party hierarchy, and
ideologists in the late Soviet era.The Russian Orthodox Church, with its ecumenical and
implicitly pro-Western orientation, should be approached
in the context of these problems. It is true that the Church
had fought against proselytization by Western especially
churches. But the conﬂict was not a case of conﬂicting
ideologies or religious doctrines but a turf war. Indeed, the
Orthodox Church, loaded with corruption, money-making,
and full incorporation in the state bureaucracy, could
hardly compete with Protestant and other preachers of the
Western branches of Christianity who not only received no
material beneﬁt for coming to Russia but often spent their
own money. This attracted believers and alarmed the
Orthodox Church. Here, the Church was no different from
the Russian state, which also is quite hostile to various
Protestant denominations it cannot fully control. In driving
the competitors out of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church
followed not its own interests, but also the commands of
the state.
The Orthodox Church also followed the state in other
ways. The present Russian state, and, consequently, the
Russian elite, whom the state represents, have problems
with the West. Still, they are basically Western-oriented, or
at least regard the West as much closer to Russia than any
other civilization. This is especially the case with West/
Central Europe. Sensing this inclination of the Russian
authorities, the representatives of the Russian Orthodox
Church have also demonstrated their basically pro-Western
inclinations. For example, the Church believes Russia
should be part of the European Union (Lenta.ru, 2008).
While for the Russian elite, Western European civiliza-
tion is associated with the good life, in the minds of poor
disenfranchised Russians who regard themselves as
brazenly deceived by the rulers of the post-Soviet era, the
West has quite a different meaning. It is often associated
with their present misery, and they see the pro-Western
orientation of the Russian Orthodox Church as helping
the elite plunder average Russians. For quite a few disen-
chanted members of the populace, it is just a sign that the
Church has abandoned both Christ and themdaverage
Orthodox Russians. The Western orientation of the Church
made its elite absolutely cynical and corrupt, quite similar
to the Russian elite.
The passionate debate among the elite, or at least the
middle class, as to what degree Russia should follow the
West or retain its peculiar social/economic and political
arrangements, is absolutely irrelevant for the poor. For
them, regardless of any turn of state machinery or ideo-
logical twist, the state will be just as alienated from them.
The struggle inside the elite and Russia’s dealingdfriendly
or hostiledwith the West are also not of much concern,
and they watch these affairs with skeptical indifference.
While pro- and anti-Western elite and the Orthodox
Church are pretty much the same in ignoring of the plight
of the poor, the story is different with Diomid. In the view
of his supporters he is poor, sincere, and not afraid to suffer
for the cause. Diomid is a different fellow in their viewdcut
from different materials from the Russian elite both in and
outside the church. This difference makes Diomid quite an
appealing ﬁgure, and gives his philippics regarding church,
state, and the entire social/economic arrangements of the
post-Soviet era resonance among the populace. Even those
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ﬁgure. Vladimir Solo’ev, the well-known Jewish commen-
tator, stated that as a Jew he could not be seen as too pre-
disposed to Diomid; still, he acknowledged that Diomid
actually behaved as a saintly ﬁgure. Indeed, he could be
seen as a living Orthodox saint (Credo.ru, 2008f).
Diomid also has supporters among the Church hier-
archy. Nineteen priests, including Aleksandr Shargunov and
Tikhon Shevkunov, signed a letter in support (Credo.ru,
2008g,h). His sincerity and true concern for the Church
and people attracted not just conservative priests but even
those with liberal leanings to his side. Igumen Grigorii
(Lur’e) pointed out in an interview that Diomid is quite
different from other members of the Russian Orthodox
Church, especially its ofﬁcials. These people are absolutely
cynical; Diomid is very sincere; and, by exposing church
corruption he has made the Russian Orthodox Church quite
weak. He added that in the near future, the Russian
Orthodox Church will lose the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
He stated in an interview that he had received a lot of
letters in which people had expressed full support for his
position (Anon, 2008).
Thus, Diomid represented the views of disenfranchised
people who trust neither Westernized liberals nor ofﬁcial,
so to speak, nationalists who believe that Russia as it is
could uphold its position as an authoritarian Orthodox
country modeled after the Byzantine Empire. For people of
the Diomidian type, Russian Orthodox ofﬁcial nationalism
and the Westernism of liberals and many of the Russian
elite are hostile entities. All of themdnationalists inside
and outside the church, Westernized liberals, and the
conniving Westdare scheming to bring harm to the
Russian people, especially those with a true attachment to
Orthodox Christianity. And they approached the movie
from this perspective.
Some observers assume that the movie is a conniving
plot of the West, that it is unable to boost Russians’ morale
and helps theWestern elitemobilize public opinion against
Russia. “Nikolai” noted that the movie is the result of
a global political play (Nikolai, 2008). The USA spends a lot
of money to study Byzantine history to promote American
geopolitical ambitions. He implied that the movie itself
could possibly have been instigated by the USA. The reason
for this is simple. Themovie demonstrates that Russians are
still obsessed with the Byzantine Empire and global
ambitions in general. This could be used by the US elite to
scare its allies and the American masses and rally them
against Russia. In this context, one should not be surprised
that the West emerged as Orthodox Russia’s enemy.
While the movie might well be designed as an ideo-
logical plot against Russia organized by the West, another
interpretation is also possible. It could be seen as a
conniving plot designed by the Russian nouveaux riches,
who play the patriotic card while betraying Russian inter-
ests. “Soldier of Russian White Tsar-Emperor of Eurasia”
(“Soldat Russkogo Belogo Tsaria-Imperatora Evrazii”)
stated that the movie was the creation of the Kremlin
(Soldat Russkogo, 2008). It could be the beginning of
Russian revanche, the real conﬂict with the West. But it
could be just a satanic play by Putin, who under external
patriotism continued to make Russia subservient to theWest. If so, Putin and his retinue will not escape punish-
ment from the Lord. In this interpretation, true Orthodox
Russians, betrayed by the Church and the Russian state, are
doomed, and in the long run the Russian state is doomed
with them.
These people have rather a gloomy outlook. For them,
de-spiritualization and, implicitly, de-Christianization of
the countrydChristianity is obviously related to the purity
of Orthodoxydstarted when foreign inﬂuence brought
Russia harm and started the country’s demise centuries
ago. Spiritual debasement goes along with the increasing
power of the Russian state, which has become entirely alien
to the majority of the populace. It also goes along with the
increasing role of minorities, who have pushed ethnic
Russians, especially true Orthodox believers, aside. There is
some hope Russia can still stand on her feet, but the chance
is not great.
Elaborating on this, a certain “Yuri K.” proposed that
Tikhon and the people behind him created the movie to
mobilize the masses to defend the Russian state, but they
actually showed that Russia, like the Byzantine Empire, is
doomed. Throughout the centuries, Russia departed more
and more from its healthy Orthodox archetype. The real
Russia existed only before the thirteenth century (Yuri,
2008). During the Kievan period and shortly after, Russia
was a free and purely Slavic Orthodox society. The impli-
cation is that Orthodoxy, received from Constantinople,
was not tainted by political Byzantinism or in some other
way. After this, Russians was exposed to the inﬂuence of
other civilizationsdall bringing the country and the people
nothing but harm.
The Byzantine Empire, indeed, contributed to the
shaping of the country’s political culture after providing
Russians with the gift of Orthodoxy. Still even at that time,
the Byzantine inﬂuence was hardly benign. Indeed, the
Byzantines did the same as the Mongols and, in a way, the
West, after Peter. All of them brought Russia despotism and,
in the case of the Byzantines, and implicitly the Mongols/
Tatars, ignorance. At present, “Yuri K.” implied, after accu-
mulating the negative aspects of all cultures, Russia is likely
close to the end of its historical existence, and one should
approach the movie and the more general ideological
program of the regime from this perspective.
“Yuri K.” stated that the authorities are quite logical in
their ideological construction and brainwashing. The
regime is in a big crisis, and for this reason the authorities
try to prevent Russians from understanding the true depth
of the problem by ideological make-believe. They spread
ideas about Russia’s essential health, all its problems
notwithstanding. This illusion pertains not just to the
regime but to the country and the people.
Russia is in deep crisis and could possibly be saved by
some extraordinarymeasure such as fascist Germany used to
save itself, “Yuri K.” continued. Here, the Nazi revolution is
seen as not so much a symbol of genocidal slaughter and
imperial expansion as a conservative revolution that would
returnRussia to its pre-Mongol roots and conditions. Itwould
be a country dominated by Slavs, grassroots democracy, and
pristine Orthodoxy unpolluted by bureaucratic perversion.
Similar views are shared by others who see the ideal
Orthodox Russia not so much as pre-Mongol but as pre-
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Russian nineteenth-century Slavophiles who saw in Peter
the Great the polluter of true Russian culture.
Andrei Ezerov stated that the Byzantines are “our
everything. I love more only Moscow Russia” (Ezerov,
2008). The Byzantines and Moscow-Russia are a model
for “conservative revolutions,” and he wished these revo-
lutions to take place in Russia. They would spiritualize the
country and bring it back to its true Orthodox roots. Still, he
did not believe that this would happen.
Mariia (2008) had an even gloomier outlook and saw no
hope for the country’s spiritual revival. For her, the Russian
elite and even the Church have degenerated. They were
Orthodox by external trappings but actually anti-Orthodox,
even anti-Christian in their essence. She noted that, while
some skeptics assume Russians are spiritually degenerate,
the majority of those who believe in the importance of
Orthodoxy still hold the notion that Russia is basically an
Orthodox country. The West could not stand Orthodoxy
with its high spirituality. This explains Russia’s perennial
conﬂict with the West. Russia and the Byzantine Empire
were, indeed, great states when they followed strictly the
maxims of the Orthodox Church.
While true believers in both Russia and the Byzantine
Empire continued to uphold the maxims of Orthodoxy, the
elite and even the Church actually became godless. This can
be seen in Russia today. The Russian elite and the Church’s
approach to the Jews is a good illustration of this degen-
eration. The Jews prepare kosher food in the Kremlin, the
Russian Orthodox holy place, and celebrate Hannukah on
Red Squaredanother sacred place. This is supported not
only by the Russian elite but even by the Orthodox Church.
Moreover, Medvedev is actually a Jew.
Thus, for those who support Diomid and whose views
could be compared with those of 17th century “Old
Believers” or idiosyncratic Protestants, the present hier-
archy is betraying Orthodoxy; and Diomid’s supporters are
calling for the return of Orthodoxy to its pristine past.
1.1. Pagan response
For others, Orthodoxy itself is one of the sources of evil,
and Russia’s liberation would return Russia to its pre-
Orthodox Christian past. The deep alienation of quite
a few ethnic Russians from the present state, and Ortho-
doxy as an integral part of it, as well as the rise of Russian
nationalism, have led to a curious resurrection of paganism
in its “most primitive (grubykh) manifestations” (Islam
News, 2009). Neo-paganism apparently started in the
1990s, directly inspired by the European and American
Right. Their approach to Christianity was not consistent.
Some of them tried a rather curious way to combine racism,
a sort of implicit paganism, with Christianity. And here
some of them were deﬁnitely inﬂuenced by American
racists. One of the essential problems with American
racism was that the white population in the USAdthe
historical melting potdhad a much less developed sense of
belonging to particular ethnic groups deﬁned in purely
biological forms, quite different from themajority of Social-
Darwinist racists in Europe in the second half of the nine-
teenth-century. The strong role of Christianity, especially inthe Protestant versions, as the essential attribute of the
white members of society also made it impossible for them
to shake Christianity as a harmful attribute as easily as had
been done by the Nazis in Germany. This notion of
“Aryanism,” which persisted among American Neo-Nazis,
was combined with a curious blend of paganism and
respect for Christianity. The same curious mix of neo-
paganism with Christianity could be seen in the Russian
Orthodox National-Socialist Movement (RPNSD). The
supporters of the movement promulgate their support of
“religious-racial doctrine.” According to the proponents of
this doctrine, Aryan peopledRussians are seen Aryandare
the real Christians and Jews, the chosen people. The people
who call themselves Jews have nothing to do with Judaism
and the majority of the people who call themselves Chris-
tians have no relationship with Christianity. The curious
combination of racist neo-paganismwith Christianity could
also be seen by the fact that Hitler was dubbed “Christ-
loving Leader” (Shekhovtsov, 2007).
Some representatives of Russian racist neo-paganism are
not consistent in their denial of Christianity, others are more
so. This latter group, inﬂuenced by the European Right,
regard Western civilization as primarily the civilization of
the white mandJews are not seen as part of the white
community. They see Christianity as evil, one of the ideo-
logical backdrops of “political correctness,” which helps
nonwhites engage in extermination or at least marginaliza-
tion of the white man in the heart of the white worldd
Europe and the USA. Following the “European Sinergia”
pattern, groups of racist neo-pagans emerged in Russia by
the 1990s. One group, led by Vladimir Avdeev and Anatolii
Ivanov (Skuratov), had as a vehicle the journal Nasledie
predkov (The Heritage of Ancestors). Avdeev apparently was
the major ideologist. This neo-paganism became complete
in the sense that Avdeev not only emphasized the centrality
of race in human history but also regarded Christianity as
absolutely foreign to Aryans, Russians, of course, included
(Shnirel’man, 2007: 190).
Racist neo-paganism continued to spread. In the 2000s,
books with these ideas were actively integrated in the
educational process in someMoscow colleges (Shnirel’man,
2007: 205). An international conference, at which the
notorious David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan in America, was present, was held June
8–10, 2006, in the building of the International Foundation
for Slavic Culture and Language (Mezhdunarodnyi Fond
Slavianskoi Pismenosti i Kultury). By 2009, there were at
least 20 groups of neo-pagans/pagans (Rosbalt, 2009a).
Apparently, theyoftenengaged invarious criminal activities,
from vandalism to murder (Kozhevnikova, 2007: 38). These
groups, expressed strong dislike of Christianity and other
monotheistic religions in the Russian state, even in its
present form. They believed that Christianity was hostile to
ethnic Russians. They professed support of “Slavic sepa-
ratism” (Ukolov, 2009), e.g., shedding ethnic enclaves of the
Russian Federation where Russians could not dominate
completely. Someneo-pagans engaged in terrorist activities.
Onegroup, forexample,was ledbya seventeen-year-oldgirl,
whohad instilledothermembers of the groupwith the ideas
of paganism (Grani.ru, 2009), or at least was converted to
paganism, together with the other members of the group.
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non-European, the neo-pagans also look at priests as their
enemies. Logically, Orthodox churches and priests are
among their targets (Anon, 2009; Rosbalt, 2009b,c;
Zaritovskii, 2008; Zheglov et al., 2009). In this new
edition of paganism, pre-Christian Russia is considered the
ideal society. The Byzantine Empire is seen as an Orthodox
state that brought Christianity; Christianity is viewed as
irrelevant, or even hostile, to Russia.
Here, basically two models exist. According to one
model, the harm brought by the Byzantines and Orthodoxy
was, in many ways, due to the fact that both actually rep-
resented Asians, whose ethnicity/race and culture were
deeply hostile to white, purely Aryan Russians. Russians
were truly democratic, freedom-loving, highly advanced
people. The suppressive Byzantine Empire and Christians in
general were people with an implicitly Asiatic slant.
Consequently, Christianity could bring Russia nothing but
harm either in the past or in the future.
The other model implies that the Byzantines and
Orthodoxy were harmful for Russia regardless whether
they were Asiatic forces or not. Neo-pagansdone could
assume that neo-paganism is an essential ingredient in the
ideology of a considerable number of rising Russian right-
wing and often neo-Nazi extremistsdare strongly anti-
Asian. One need not engage in a detailed study of their
outlook. Their actions provide enough information about
their views. Asians, what Russian extremists usually call
people of “Caucasian nationality”danyone who comes
from the Caucasus and who looks swarthydare the major
target of their attacks. Thus, this basically anti-Asian atti-
tude had been telescoped from the past and reﬂected in the
neo-pagan views of the Byzantine origin of Christianity and
the Mongols and their role in Russian history. These views
on all these periods of history are interconnected.
Neo-pagan views on theMongols are distinctly different
from what one sees in Neo-Eurasianists, the proponents of
the creed popular in the late Yeltsin/early Putin era. For
Neo-Eurasianists such as Alexander Dugin, the Mongol
invasion was a fusion of Asians and Orthodox Russians
that led to a “symbiosis” of two similar peoples. Racial and
cultural/religious differences were downplayed, and
Mongols and Russians were seen as having “complemen-
tary” cultures. For this reason, the Mongol Empire was
praised as the builder of Russian statehood. This vision of
the Mongols was resolutely rejected by neo-pagans. They
regard Mongols as culturally and especially racially foreign
to Russians. This negative vision of Asians in general could
be seen in Internet discussions centered on the discussed
movie, in which some who seem to be neo-pagans were
engaged.
Elaborating on the rule of Mongols in Russian history,
one commentator (Chernyi-Foma-Aleks, 2008) noted that
while uncivilized themselves, they were in touch with the
great civilizations of the Orient, such as China and Iran, and
transmitted this great cultural historical tradition to Russia.
For other observers, the Mongols were absolutely negative.
One stated that the Russians could hardly have gotten
anything from the Tatars/Mongols. Russians see Mongols
only in the capacity of looters. The Mongol invasions played
quite a negative role in Russian history.The profound anti-Asianism that permeates neo-
paganism led to a peculiar vision of Byzantines and
Orthodoxy, in fact, of Christianity in general. In this
approach, Asia was not opposed to Byzantinism and
Orthodoxy, as was the point of Russian social thought and
historiography for centuries. Byzantinism, Orthodoxy, and
even Christianity in general became deeply integrated with
Asianism. Consequently, Asianism penetrated Russian
statehood and political culture from all sides. The ugly
aspects of Russian political culture come not just from the
Mongol Empire but also from the Byzantine Empire and
even Orthodoxy, Christianity in general. This all-embracing
Asianism led to tragic results for the Russian people: a state
prompted by Asiatic Orthodoxy, which subjugated the
RussiansdEuropean people. Their suffering from these
Asiatic foreign entities a long time ago continues to the
present.
1.2. Russians as the victims of despotic Christian Asiatics
The viewpoint of “Navod,” one of the commentators on
the movie, illustrates the views of those who believe that
since time immemorial Russians, wholesome Aryan
pagans, were subjugated by alien Asiatic forces.
In an Internet discussion, “Navod” proclaimed himself
a Russian patriot and a member of the nationalistic orga-
nization Pamiat’ (Memory) since 1985 (Navod, 2008). He
cannot understand why Byzantinism and Orthodoxy are so
important, for pagan Russia was a highly civilized and
developed country of free people whereas the Byzantine
Empire was a slave-owner society. In addition, Russia was
much older than Byzantium. Russia has at least a ten- to
twelve-thousand-year-history, and it is absolute sacrilege
to glorify the Byzantine Empire and see it as the spiritual
forefather of Russia. Slave-owner despots and free pagan
Russians were too different not to be sworn enemies.
Naturally, “Navod” pointed out, an enclave of thousands of
Russians could not stand this abomination. The Russian
princes Oleg and Sviatoslav attacked the Byzantine Empire
not because of vanity but because they regarded it as their
duty to liberate their brothers and sisters from slavery. The
Byzantines were not able to defeat and subjugate the
freedom-loving and bellicose Russians. But they found
a way to accomplish their goal by other means: they
seduced the Russians with Christianity.
“Navod” continued that the Russian Baptism was
nothing but a form of subjugation of peaceful Russians by
the Byzantines. The emperor used enormous resources to
ideologically and physically subjugate Russia, with Vladi-
mir, supported by an army of foreign mercenaries, as
a stooge. In 988, the Byzantines installed in Russia a Quis-
ling type of regime. Vladimir, the puppet, engaged in
genocide against the Russians and provided considerable
booty to the Byzantines. Thosewho followed him did pretty
much the same. It is not surprising that the period from 988
to approximately 1500 (the Byzantine collapse) was one of
the darkest eras of Russian history: Russia was actually
a colony of a sort of the Byzantine Empire.
One should remember that Mongols/Tatars ruled Russia
from the 13th to the 15th century. This replacement of what
most Russian historians called the Mongol/Tatar Yoke by
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Mongol/Tatars were pretty much the same, and that
Byzantine rule over Russia was the rule of Asiatics over
European, Slavic people. Although Russians ﬁnally liberated
themselves from the Byzantine yoke, it was reinstated in
a way in present-day Russia.
Similarities between Russia today and the Byzantine
Empire can be easily seen, according to “Navod”. The
empire was a predatory state that lived on fraud and piti-
less exploitation of periphery peoples, approximately as
Moscow does with the rest of Russia now. The current
regime clearly continues to treat Russians in the old,
oppressive Byzantine/Orthodox fashion and clearly
demonstrates the pro-Asiatic, actually anti-Russian incli-
nation of the Russian state. Indeed, Moscow rulers clearly
helped the Muslims. The misdeeds of the Byzantine Empire
are perpetuated now by people from the Caucasus. They
kidnap Russian girls and enslave them as sex toys or sell
them for the harems and brothels of the Middle East. While
brutal Asiatics continue their mistreatment of Russians, the
Russian state does nothing. It is obviously on the side of
Asiatics and so perpetuates centuries-old traditions.
The connection of the Byzantines with Muslims and the
implicit attempt to “Asiatize” people could be seen in other
comments. For example, Vales (2008) noted that the
Byzantine Empire was an “Asian Middle Ages empire” and
its death of hardly any concern to Russians. Russians should
be glad of the collapse of the oppressive Asiatic empire and
the weakening of Orthodoxy, which is also implicitly con-
nectedwith Asia and a force hostile to Russians. Elaborating
on the essential hostility of the Orthodox Church and
Russian state to ethnic Russians, Porudchik (2008) noted
that, according to historians, by the tenth century one-third
of the Slavic population in Russia had disappeared,
replaced by non-Slavs. This displacement or actual elimi-
nation of the Slavic population was the handiwork of the
Orthodox Church and the Russian elite, an Asiatized force.
This Asiatization of the country, the elimination of healthy
European/Asian Aryan Russians and replacement by
worthless Asiatics, had profound implications for the
country’s future. This presence of Asiatics in Russia has
weakened the country. This made its conquest by other
AsiaticsdMongolsd200 years later an easy enterprise.
Indeed, “Porudchik” implied, some Asiatics in Russia
welcomed the Mongols, their racial kin. The Slavic/Aryan
population was too weak to ﬁght the Mongols, and as
a result became enslaved by them.
Some people, however, praised the Mongols as the
builders of a great empire. They claimed that Russians were
happy and proud to be part of the Mongol Empire because
Russians and Mongols lived in a condition of happy
“symbiosis.” The Mongol Empire was a Russian empire as
well, or at least it helped Russians create a great empire in
the future. “Porudchik” pointed to Alexander Dugin, the
well-known supporter of Eurasianism/Neo-Eurasianism in
Russia, who sees unity/symbiosis between ethnic Russians
and the non-Slavic, mostly Asian, people of Russia as the
source of the country’s strength.
Dugin and similar-minded Eurasianists also downplay
race as an essential aspect of nations, however, and
“Porudchik” could not accept this. He mocked Dugin, whowanted Russians to be united with the Mongol-Tatars, as
well as those who looked at the Byzantine Empire as
Russia’s origin and the model to follow. These people not
only held that Russians should be united with racially alien
Asiatics but also downplayed the racial aspects of the
Russian people as a source of their strength. This source is
their bloodline. The real ancestors of the Russian people
are Scythians, a truly Aryan people; this people’s history
and achievement was the real source of Russian strength,
not the openly Asiatic Mongol Empire or cryptic Asiatic
Byzantines and Orthodox. Elaborating on Russians’
achievements as a pagan people (paganism as truly a reli-
gion was juxtaposed to Asiatic/crypto-Asiatic Orthodoxy,
Christianity in general), “Porudchik” noted that Russians
indeed created a great empire. They did so not with the
help of but despite Orthodoxy and the Russian state. These
were on the side of the Mongols, sworn enemies of
the Russian people and Russian empire. The anti-Russian
policy of the Russian Orthodox Church could be seen by
the fact that Metropolitan Cyprian anathematized Dmitry
Donskoy when he was ready to ﬁght the Mongols.
For some observers, the Byzantine Empire and Ortho-
doxy were both Asiatic institutions and ideologies; and
hence harmful for Russians. Other observers had modiﬁed
views. They did not claim that the Byzantines were Asiatics
or that Orthodoxy was an Asiatic creed. But they believed
Orthodoxy had been harmful for both Byzantines and
Russians. “Silovik” (2008) (a member of the security agency
and military) stated that Orthodox Christianity brought no
good to the Russians or Byzantines. One should not over-
estimate the role of Orthodoxy in the fate of nations. The
Russian state emerged when the elite were pagan. Svia-
toslav, actually Svendisleif (here “Silovik” implied he was
a Viking), was pagan, and this did not prevent him from
defeating the Jewish Khazar state. Orthodoxy also hardly
inspired the Byzantines to defend their country. Con-
stantinople had many people, but only a few thousand
defended it against the Turks. Not only did Orthodoxy
transform people into unpatriotic cowards, it also blinded
the rulers and made them unable to make the proper
geopolitical moves.
In “Silovik”’s opinion the problem with the Byzantine
emperors was not that they were betrayed and corrupted
by the West but that they cavorted with Asians. When the
crusaders entered the Holy Land, the Byzantine emperor,
instead of helping, actually ordered Pechenegs to attack
them. Thus, Byzantinism/Orthodoxy brought nothing
positive to Russia. Even those who do not see in them an
Asiatic force hostile to Russia, representatives of an alien
culture, still consider the Byzantine tradition a deadly
potion of abusive practices that has harmed Russia up to
the present. Indeed, the Byzantine Empire is still alive in
Russia today, a tradition of abuse and corruption.
Another contributor, “Rus” (2008), noted that bringing
Christianity to Russia led immediately to the end of ancient
Russian liberties. Christianity suppressed Russian traditional
beliefs and led to the rise of brutal and repressive powers.
This tradition of abuse survived to the present and is the real
legacy of Byzantium. “Rus” noted that he saw Byzantinism
every day in Russia, in the criminality and abuse of power by
the authorities. This policy, perpetuated by Putin and
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source of all present problems, “Rus” believes.
The reference to Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow, under-
scores the deep hostility to Moscow among provincial folk
who regard it as a parasite who lives at the expense of
others. It also indicates lingering separatist feelings, the
desire to make the centralized state as weak as possible.
This could be seen even more clearly in other comments.
“Patriot Sibiri” (Patriot of Siberia) (2008) noted that the
Byzantine Empire started to ﬂourish anewwhen the capital
was transferred from Constantinople to another city. The
same should be done in Russia. Instead of Moscow, the
capital should be placed in a city in the Urals. Makar (2008)
fully supported this idea and said the capital should be in
Novosibirsk. “Siber v NATO” (2008) noted that the capital is
not needed at all, and each Russian region should have
broad self-government.
1.3. Ethnic minorities as a problem
For some, the major reason for the collapse of the
empire was the loss of ethnic homogeneity. The problem
with the Byzantine Empire was not that it had lost its
Orthodox purity. The empire was not a monoethnic state
and included a lot of minorities. It was actually an “Arme-
nian-Greek” state, and its people thought about nothing
but money. Such a state could not be stable, and it was not
surprising that it fell under the pressure of “people-
warriors” (Sergei, 2008).
Other observers shared similar ideas. The major reason
for the collapse of the empire was that it had lost its ethnic
cohesiveness and become polluted by minorities (Il’ia,
2007). Therefore, disenfranchised members of Russian
society who watched Tikhon’s movie regarding the history
of the Byzantine Empire believe it sent a potent signal for
the fate of the Russian state. Russia, in their view, could
disappear or exist only as a state deeply foreign to the
interests of the majority of Russians.
For some, supporters of Diomid, salvation would be in
return to true Christian roots; for others, neo-Nazis and
neo-pagans, it was return to the pre-Christian past. All of
them implied that return to what they regarded as true
Russia was a difﬁcult enterprise, but some did not regard
this enterprise as entirely impossible. If this happened,
Russia would reemerge as the country of Russian people
and be a prosperous state. Still, for some Russian intellec-
tuals who appeal to the history of the Byzantine Empire, in
connection with Tikhon’s movie or on other occasions,
Russia has no hope. Like the Byzantine Empire, Russia will
perish because all empires perish sooner or later.
1.4. The death of empires as a natural process
For some Russian intellectuals, the death of the Byzan-
tine Empire, the collapse of the USSR, and Russia’s future
collapse are simply a natural process. Everything that is
born dies sooner or later. The inevitable death of the state/
empire does not necessarily have negative implications for
Russia. This was the case with the supporters of the idea,
“Russia for Russians,” with their strong isolationist philos-
ophies; for them, any empire, actually any big state, isharmful for Russians, for in all these the minority and
minority-supported bureaucracy live well at the expense of
ethnic Russians. In this context an empire is not Russia’s
salvation but its curse.
One could compare the Byzantine collapse with that of
the USSR and not be upset with Russia’s losing its imperial
greatness. Indeed, some participants in the discussion
argued, Russia should not be dismayed about the collapse
of the empire: if the USSR were still present, Russians
would have been obliged to share oil income with other
republics. This theory implies that Russia in its current form
is not big and has too many minorities who live at the
expense of ethnic Russians, reducing Russia’s size even
farther. Shedding the ethnic enclaves would homogenize
Russia from an ethnic point of view and ensure its survival
and even prosperity as a true Slavic/European state.
This praise of the end of the empire is not dominant, at
least among those who ponder Russia’s fate in the Byzan-
tine scenario. For most of these, the collapse of the USSR
will lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation
without positive implications for Russians. Russia will not
emerge after these changes (shedding its imperial and
mostly non-Slavic heritage) as an ethnically homogeneous
and prosperous Slavic statedpossibly part of Europedbut
will disappear for good. And the end of Russia will be the
end of the Russian people.
An important aspect of these viewsdof course, in the
context of Byzantine historydis that Russia’s and Russians’
death is not something special but a natural process. One
might guess that Lev Gumilev inﬂuenced the writer.
Gumilev, a Eurasianist, believed in a natural symbiosis
between Russian and Turkic people. At the same time, his
theory had another aspect. Gumilev blended Social
Darwinism of a sort with the philosophy of Russian cosm-
ism; the inﬂuence of Alexander Chizhevsky could be
regarded as most important. For Chizhevsky, the cosmos
had a direct inﬂuence on social processes of the earth,
including revolutions. In Gumilev’s interpretation, Chiz-
hevsky’s approach was “Darwinized.” The cosmic process,
the impulses one receives from the cosmos, led to the
emergence of ethnos and what Gumilev called “super-
ethnos,” a quasi-biological organism that moved through
the stages of birth, youth, maturity, and death. Gumilev’s
approach is clearly also similar to that of Oswald Spengler,
albeit it is not clear that Gumilev was aware of Spengler’s
existence when he created his theory. The “Gumilevian”
idea about the natural death of nations was often employed
by those who believed Russia had achieved the limits of its
historical existence andwould die in the foreseeable future.
In this respect, Russia is similar to other states/empires
of the past. Like the Byzantine and Roman empires, Russia
will fall apart and disappear. The process that started with
the disintegration of the USSR was just the beginning of the
complete collapse of Russia as a state and civilization. This
assumption is shared by the protagonist of the novel After
Russia (Posli Rossii) (Krasheninnikov, 2008). Fedor Kra-
sheninnikov, the author, from Ekaterinberg (Urals), visual-
izes the ﬁnal disappearance of Russia in the not too distant
future; Roman and Byzantine history help the protagonists
understand the reason and meaning of the event. The
novel, published on the Internet, described the situation in
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ceased to exist after a crisis that followed what seems to
have been unshakable prosperity. (Interestingly enough,
this statement about the imminent coming of a great crisis
was made before the 2008 economic crisis, which has
affected Russia, together with other parts of the world.)
During this crisis, the weakness of the present Russian
Federation was revealed immediately. One of the protago-
nists remembered a meeting of representatives from the
different regions of the Russian Federation. They all spoke
Russian, but they had absolutely different interests and
looked like people from completely different countries
with no ties to keep them together besides the direct power
of the state. And, as soon as the state became weak as the
result of the crisis, Russia immediately fell apart.
Russia’s friends and neighbors, ranging from great
powers such as the USA and China to republics of the
former USSR, immediately took advantage of the situation
and tried to make the disintegration of the country
permanent. They each had their sphere of inﬂuence in post-
Russian space. They also encouraged the development of
local separatist ideologies. The local elite also tried to instill
the local populace with the belief that there were no such
people as Russians: there were separate people, such as
Siberians or Uralians, who had nothing in common with
each other. Moreover, these ideologists tried to convince
the locals that the Russian state in the pastdwith Moscow
as its epitomedwas their natural enemy. Still, some people
of these states remembered Russia and wished to bring it
back to life. This led to uprisings led by Pirogov, who was
able to reassemble most of the Russian Federation around
Moscow. Pirogov’s enterprise did not last very long, and his
new and last Russia ﬁnally collapsed.
The reasons for Pirogov’s debacle were manifold. To
start with, the possibility of Russia’s resurrection alarmed
the other powers who were used to dominating post-
Russian space and eager to exploit anti-Moscow feeling
among its residents. Anotherdthe author implieddeven
more important reasonwhy Pirogov’s enterprise failed was
the attitude of the majority of the residents of this post-
Russian space. Their attitude was compared to that of
those who lived in the territories of the Roman and
Byzantine empires during their decline. Similar to the
Romans and Byzantines, as well as the barbarians who took
the land of the two empires, the residents of post-Russian
space had no attachment to the state, in Russian or espe-
cially Soviet form. They saw it as an alien body. Conse-
quently, they had no nostalgia for a grand imperial past and
did not care what happened to post-Russian space in the
future.
Seva, another protagonist, stated that the present resi-
dents of the various Russian republics had no nostalgia for
the USSR. They could be compared with the barbarians
after the collapse of the Roman Empire: they had no
emotional attachment to their Roman heritage and could
use pieces of Roman temples to build toilets
(Krasheninnikov, 2008: 59–60). Thus, like the Roman and
Byzantine empires, Russia is doomed. Other protagonists
pointed out that, like the residents of those empires,
Russians could hardly do anything to prevent the ﬁnal
collapse (22–23). While not able to prevent its demise, theycould at least choose the way their state would ﬁnally
disappear. As Pirogov himself started to ponder about the
ultimate and apparently irreversible process of disintegra-
tion, images from the Byzantine and Roman past started to
emerge in his mind.
At the beginning of Pirogov’s venture, he seems to have
been quite successful. While most Russians were passive
and uninterested in anything not directly related to their
personal interests, some retained the memory of Russia’s
past glory and supported Pirogov. But this drive for Russia’s
uniﬁcation was dashed. Most of Pirogov’s initial supporters
soon lost interest in the enterprise. His right-hand man
became a degenerate neo-Nazi with no understanding of
reality. The apparatus of power Pirogov tried to recreate
from the bureaucratic material he inherited from the
previous regime was absolutely rotten. Even the Orthodox
Church was of no help in his endeavors. Some provincial
church leaders joined the separatists on this or that excuse;
even the Patriarch was an opportunistic and self-seeking
individual who thought mostly about his personal career
and security rather than the interests of Russia and even
the Orthodox Church. Watching the behavior of the Church
and bureaucracy, Pirogov thought he should purge all of
them and believed that shooting all this scum would be
a last gift to the Russian people. While outraged by the
behavior and attitude of the elite, Pirogov himself was not
up to his role as Russia’s deliverer. He was a vain person
who was soon infatuated with the external trappings of
power and engaged in numerous love affairs.
While the Moscovite elite and those who initially sup-
ported Pirogov’s project were not up to their grand task,
foreign powers easily exploited the lingering anti-Moscow
feeling among a considerable number of provincial folk and
led an anti-Pirogov army against Moscow. Watching his
enemies approach, Pirogov immersed himself in gloomy
meditation and engaged in comparing the approaching
demise of the Russian state with the ends of the empires of
the past. Roman/Byzantine history became the most
appropriate example.
Pirogov noted that the Roman Empire had collapsed in
two ways: the collapse of the Western Empire and the
bloody end of the Eastern Empire. He wondered what kind
of end Russia, uniﬁed after disintegration, would choose
(Krasheninnikov, 2008: 22, 23, 101, 102). Actually, the end
of the Russian state was something in between. After one
Pirogov victory, the anti-Pirogov forces entered Moscow,
and Russia ﬁnally and irreversibly fell apart. The author
implied that Russia’s end was, in many ways, predestined,
for the country had reached the limits of its historical
existence. Pirogov’s attempt to resurrect it was ill-fated,
like attempt of some Roman and Byzantine emperors to
prevent the complete demise of their empires when they
had reached their natural historical limits.
Other Russian authors with similar views and interest in
Byzantine history also had a chance to present their
pictures of the past on the Internet. Sergei Cherniakhovsky,
author of the historical essay “Byzantinism as Agony”
(Cherniakhovskii, 2008) pointed out that the rise and the
collapse of the empire is a natural processdhere, he
implicitly evokes Gumilev. The Byzantine rise and fall was
basically unrelated to the speciﬁcs of Byzantine civilization,
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peculiar characteristics, but followed the models of other
empires and collapsed under the pressure of young and
vigorous people when it reached its lifespan.
A certain Galler (2007) also evoked the theory of the still
popular Gumilev in analyzing the Tikhon movie. He said
that thosewho created themovie should read Gumilev, and
this would explain to them the reason for the end of the
Byzantine Empire. The appeal to Gumilev was also made by
another observer, who stated that Russians should not
study anyone, including the Byzantine Empire, or try to ﬁnd
in Byzantine history all sorts of crystal balls for predicting
the country’s future. What is now going on with Russia
should not perplex anyone. Russia is just following its
national historical process. It is now in a phase of “inertia,”
and, according to Gumilev, it will last another 300–400
years (Leonid, 2008).
The evocation of Gumilev has different implications. It
shows not just that death is an unavoidable, natural process
but that even countries blessed by historydGumilev sees
the Mongol/Tatar/Russian “symbiosis” as a unique combi-
nation that ensures the stability of Eurasian civi-
lizationdﬁnally die. This sort of idea could be found in the
comments of “Petia.” Petia (2008) asserted that Russia had
several historical blessings of a sort. To start with, it was an
Orthodox country. Orthodoxy, indeed, made Russia a strong
power that was able to stop the Mongol onslaught on
Europe. Russia was not actually conquered by the Mongols
but engaged with them in a sort of healthy Eurasian
symbiosis. As a matter of fact, Russia was able to combine
the advantages of Orthodoxy with those of the Mongol
tradition. But even these advantages could not save Russia
from a younger and more vigorous civilization, such as
Islam. The onslaught of Muslims against Orthodox civili-
zations, Christians in general, started long ago with the
collapse of the Byzantine Empire, which fallen under the
pressure of the Muslims. The same fate is in store for Rus-
sia: after the defeat of the Westerners, Muslim extremists
will strike Russia.
The assumption that the death of the empire is a natural
phenomenon is shared even by those who assume some
action could delay the demise. Aleksei Murav’ev (2008)
stated that Tikhon’s movie had a very clear political
message. Russia could follow several essential rules to
avoid the fate of the Byzantine Empire in the foreseeable
future. A strong dictatorial government is important. So is
avoiding ethnocentrism or transforming ethnic groups of
the empire into foreign entities, which would doom the
state. Efﬁcient policies could also have prolonged the life of
the Byzantine Empire and could do so for the Russian state.
But these policies cannot avert what is inevitable. In
Murav’ev’s view, the death of the empire is caused by
natural reasons. Every empire will die sooner or later.
While for Murav’ev the empire will not live longer
because it has not taken Tikhon’s medicine, e.g., instilling
all ethnic groups with the feeling of trans-ethnic belonging
to the same state, for others the situation was essentially
different, and the empire’s demise has hastened the
rejection of the West. Since the Russian rulers will likely
follow Tikhon and reject the West as a true partner, Russia
will most certainly follow the Byzantine fate.A certain “Maliuta” implied that the Byzantine Empire
lived much longer than it should have. Orthodox Byzan-
tines had no desire to defend the emperor. So for several
hundred years it existed only because it was defended by
Western Catholic mercenaries. Because of the help of the
West, the Byzantine Empire was in the process of dying for
500 years.
Maliuta (2008) implied that present-day Russia is quite
similar to the Byzantine Empire. Like the Byzantines, Russia
is under the pressure of the Muslims and survives only
because it is protected by the West. The elite understand
that Russia’s collapse would lead to the general collapse of
Christian civilization. But the West will not be able to
prevent Russia’s inevitable demise; and from this position
Russia will follow the road of the Byzantine Empire. The
only difference is that the process will be much quicker and
Russia will die in a much shorter period of time. Russia will
follow the road of all states and die sooner or later.
Even the participants who did not subscribe to the
theory that all empire/states are doomed still believed
that comparison of the present-day Russia with the
Byzantine Empire hardly augurs well for the Russian state
and even the Russian people. Ivan (2007) noted that not
only did the Byzantine Empire but the Byzantines as
a people disappeared. Thus, he is hardly pleased by the
comparison, and hopes that Russia and the Russians will
avoid that ignominious end. Still, he is afraid his hope
may be in vain.
Other observers seemed to entertain the same thought.
Liuger (2008) implied that Tikhon assumed that Russia is
a new Byzantine Empire. If so, he would like to know
whether Russia is now in the year 1204 or 1453. Neither
comparison is very pleasing for Russia. Constantinople was
taken byWestern crusaders in 1204 but was resurrected for
a while. In 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks.
After this, there was no resurrection. “Liuger” believed
Russian may be closer to 1453 than to 1204.
Finally, there were observers who believed Russia is
the worst of all possible worlds. They imply that the
death of states/empires is not predestined. Still the point
is that Russia is not a viable state. Innokentii (2008)
elaborated on this in his comments. He argued that
both the Byzantine and Mongol ingredients in Russian
culture make its situation hopeless. That is, even the
most benign cultural achievements of the West reinforce
despotic ugliness and cultural-political and geo-
strategical retardation, so to speak. He considers Rus-
sia’s achievements illusory, actually nonexistent. Russia
may survive for a long time because of extraordinary luck
or a combination of the circumstances. But this luck
cannot continue indeﬁnitely, and Russia may well be
approaching the end of its historical existence. The
authorities quite possibly understand the depth of the
crisis. If, nevertheless, they attempt to imitate the
Byzantine Empire, this will just hasten the ﬁnal and
irreversible end. From this perspective, Innokentii Pavlov
fully supported Valeriia Novodvorskaia and pointed to
Vladimir Solov’ev’s famous poem prophesying that Rus-
sia’s attempt to follow the path of brutal Byzantium
would lead it to disaster. Similar to Byzantium, Russia
will fall under the onslaught of the Asiatics.
D. Shlapentokh / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 80–91901.5. Conclusion
Tikhon Shekunov’s movie on the collapse of the
Byzantine Empire, created at the very end of Putin’s pres-
idency, led to broad public response. The comments
provide opportunities for a snapshot of the ideologies and
trends prevailing in Russian society. For conservative
Russian nationalists the Byzantine experience indicated
that Russia should preserve Orthodoxy and the authori-
tarian tradition as the foundation of its political/ideological
ediﬁce and avoid the pernicious inﬂuence of the West. The
West is a mortal threat for Russia as an Orthodox civiliza-
tion. Westernized liberals have opposite views. They
believe that the Byzantine Empire did not follow the road of
the West, and regarded it as its mortal enemy. This was
a crucial mistake, for this policy exposed the Byzantine
Empire to the onslaught of Asiatics. The same will be the
fate of Russia if it shuns the West and see it as Russia’s
enemy.
Both conservative nationalists and liberal Westernizers
are part of the Russian elite. The movie made it possible to
gauge the responses of a considerable number of disen-
franchised Russians. What can be seen from their views?
The ﬁrst point that became clear was the profound pessi-
mism of all groups. The supporters of Diomid, the renegade
priest who, in a way, rolled together in his personality both
Russian Old Believers and European Protestants, believe
that Russia is, indeed, similar to the Byzantine Empire
during its decline. Both countries abandoned Orthodoxy
and tradition in general and were doomed to destruction
regardless of anything they did. The numerous neo-pagans
believe that since the 9th century or possibly earlier Russia
has been controlled and exploited by an unholy alliance of
the Orthodox Church, Jews, and Muslims.
Finally, a great many Russian intellectuals with no clear
political afﬁliation but deeply alienated from the present
situation see Russia as doomed like the Byzantine and
Roman empires plainly because everything that is born
shall die. The depth of this pessimism is truly remarkable if
we recall that the movie and discussion were launched at
the ﬁnal stage of Putin’s presidency, when there was
an endless stream of hard currency, oil/gas prices were
rising, and Russia enjoyed an economic standing as never
before.
The other essential characteristic of all these observers
is a strong anti-Muslim and anti-Asian bias. The fantasy of
Eurasianists (e.g., Gumilev and Dugin) about the healthy
symbiosis of Orthodox Russians and Muslims of various
ethnic backgrounds is absolutely foreign to this discourse.
In fact, Gumilev, extremely popular in the late Gorbachev
and Yeltsin eras, was rarely mentioned, and not to
emphasize a healthy symbiosis but to recall the quasi-
biological evolution of ethnos/“super ethnos” through
youth, maturity, aging, and death. And while Gumilev
believed Russia is still a young state/nation and thus can
expect a long life, the observers had quite different views.
For them, Russia is an old and dying state. The disintegra-
tion of the Russian empire starting with the collapse of the
USSR is not ﬁnished, and further disintegration of the
Russian Federation is to be expected, leading to a ﬁnal
demise of both country and people. This isolationist,separatist, and disintegrationist feeling are shared even by
those who, regardless of profound pessimism, still believe
Russians may live better in the future. This groupdmostly
neo-pagansdsee the way to a better future in the actual
disintegration of the present Federation. The anti-imperial,
anti-expansionist feeling is pervasive.
While all those who engaged in the discussions discard
a stable alliance with Asians, some of them, e.g., neo-
pagansdhad positive views of Europeans. For them,
Russians and Europeans are kindred Aryan people who are
subjugated by an unholy alliance of Jews, Muslims, the
Orthodox Church (Russia), and “politically correct” minor-
ities/stooges (the West). Both should shake off the foreign
yoke and live peacefully together.
What is the implication of these views for Russia’s
politics, especially now when Russia, together with other
parts of the world, has entered a period of long and quite
possibly serious economic troubles? It is clear that Russia’s
imperial drive to resurrect the USSR in this or that form is
quite limited, and the Georgian War is an aberration rather
than a resumption of the drive. Recent project to create
“Eurasian Union” should be also approached with grain of
salt. Most Russians, especially those from disenfranchised
groups, are either self-centered Russian nationalists or
Western-oriented. One could also argue that, with all this
dislike of the regime, these people would hardly stand
against it in open confrontation. From this perspective
they could be similar to the majority of Russians who,
despite the occasional and still limited, mostly anti-
minority riots, e.g., in Kondopoga and Stavropoldremain
basically passive.
However, this passivity is related to the sense that not
only is the present regime absolutely foreigndaccording to
some observers, Russians have never had a government
that addressed their interestsdbut, even in the future, the
changes, regardless of all combinations of events, would
not be for the better. This suggests that these people, while
not ready for open revolt, would not render visible support
to the state in case of a crisis. This also implies that in such
a major crisis the Russian Federation could well follow the
road of the former USSR or transform itself into a new
edition of the Holy Roman Empire. It could also combine
both scenarios in an idiosyncratic and absolutely unpre-
dictable form.
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